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I 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GLADYS P. HENDRICKS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIGHAM VICTOR HENDRICKS, 
Defendant. 
FILED 
APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF 
Case No. 7893 
0 .--t "'l L "'g ... ·· . -G~- I ::._: L. E. NELSON, 
· ----------------------------- Attorney for Plaintiff 
Clerk, Supreme Court~ .... Ut~- .... and Appellant. 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial 
District of the State of Utah, in and for Cache County. 
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IN THE SlJPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GLADYS P. HENDRICKS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIGHAM \ 7ICTOR HENDRICKS, 
Defendant. 
APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF 
Case No. 7893 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant were married at Pocatello, 
Idaho, on June 30, 1943. ( Tr. 10). This is a second mar-
riage for both parties. Each of them have children by a 
previous marriage. (Tr. 10). The defendant is 57 and 
plaintiff is about the same age. ( Tr. 83). At the time 
the parties herein were married, plaintiff resided at Logan, 
and defendant resided at Lewiston, Utah. Plaintiff had 
her furniture moved to defendant's ho~e at Lewiston, and 
they lived there until July, 1946. (Tr. 12-13 ). 
During the first year, defendant asked plaintiff to lend 
him $1,300.00. (Tr. 30). In order to comply with his 
request and not having the money available, she made a 
bank loan of $1,300.00, to be re-paid in monthly payments 
of $50.00. ( Tr. 56). Some time later, defendant re-paid 
$200.00, but failed to repay the balance of $1,100.00. 
(Tr. 30). 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
The record reveals that during the second and third 
years ( 1945-1946), defendant began to absent himself 
from their home for brief intervals, going away in his car, 
and remaining away for two or three days, without in-
forming plaintiff of his intentions before leaving, and upon 
his return home he refused to inform plaintiff where he 
had been. (Tr. 15-17, 24-25). The defendant's conduct 
became progressively worse during the third year of their 
married life, with respect to leaving home without inform-
ing plaintiff where he was going or where he had been, 
·(Tr. 24-25) and he also refused to take the plaintiff into 
his confidence with respect to what he was doing with his 
farm income. Defendant continued to leave home and 
remain away for several days at a time, and frequent quar-
rels ensued between the parties. ( Tr. 24-25). Since de-
fendant was a farmer and had no reason to make these 
trips, and wh.en he refused to take plaintiff into his con-
fidence, plaintiff became worried and upset. (Tr. 25). 
During the second and third years of their marriage, 
partly because of the fact that the defendant would not 
purchase groceries or pay for groceries that plaintiff pur-
chased, and partly because of the fact that he was fre-
quently away from home for several days at a time as here-
inbefore stated, plaintiff was compelled to use her money 
for groceries and household incidentals, and this condition 
continued more or less during the second and third years 
of their marriage and it became gradually worse. (Tr. 14-
16). 
The defendant ~ecame very indifferent with respect 
to offering to support the plaintiff, and considerable con-
troversy arose between the :parties because of his failure 
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to support her, in view of the fact that he was operating 
a large farm and presumably had a good income. During 
1945 and 1946, the plaintiff was also pestered with bill 
collectors who called on the telephone and also cam~ to 
the house to collect bills against the defendant, and which 
annoyed the plaintiff considerably. (Tr. 18-19, 23-24). · 
In July, 1946, defendant invited plaintiff to accomp-
any him to the Bear River State Bank at Tremonton, where 
he was then banking. Mter they arrived there, plaintiff 
was surprised to learn that defendant had lured her there 
to sign a note and mortgage for a loan, in order, as he 
explained to enable him to buy cattle for his son Sidney, 
so that the latter could engage in the cattle business. 
( Tr. 50-51). In view of the fact that defendant then owed 
a considerable number of old bills, had trouble with the 
Lewiston State Bank, (Tr. 23) and had failed ·to re-pay 
plaint££ the $1,100.00, which he had previously borrowed 
from her, (Tr. 30) and moreover was not producing an 
income from a very good farm, she refused to sign the 
note, and as a result thereof, the defendant became very 
resentful with the plaintiff, and on the return trip. from 
Tremonton he exhibited a quarrelsome attitude (Tr. 23} 
and, after arriving home they continued to quarrel all day. 
(Tr. 25). The plaintiff then concluded that she and the 
defendant could not live together with any degree of har-
mony, happiness or success, so she decided to· pack her 
things and furniture and move hack to Logan. Tr. 25). 
When plaintiff separated from defendant in July, 
1946, she returned to Logan and lived temporarily with 
her daughter and son-in-law. Shortly thereafter, they 
moved to Preston, Idaho, and plaintiff purchased their 
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6 
home. (Tr. 26-27). Meanwhile, during the late summer 
and early fall of 1946, defendant visited the plaintiff at 
Logan more or less frequently with a view of reconcilia-
tion, and during September or October, 1946, they re-
sumed cohabitation and lived together in plaintiffs home 
in Logan. (Tr. 26). 
The record reveals ( Tr. 31-34) that dissention again 
arose between these parties during the winter of 1946-47. 
On or about F·ebruary 19, 1947, plaintiff consulted attorney 
Dobbs at Ogden, ( Tr. 33) and as a result of her visit, 
Dobbs communicated with defendant by letter, advising 
him of plaintiffs visit and requesting defendant to call at 
Dobb's office (Pl. Ex. F.). About that time defendant 
was intending to sell the 80 acre tract of land, and in view 
of his lack of support for the period of their marriage, 
plaintiff refused to sign the deed, without a support agree-
ment; and in consequence whereof the parties hereto, 
executed this agreement (PI Ex. D.) of February 29, 1947, 
which called for repayment of loan made by plaintiff to 
defendant in 1944, upon which $1,100.00 was owing. 
Tr. 30). And, because defendant had failed to support 
the plaintiff or me~t ~he ordinary household expenses, 
plaintiff desired to. fortify her position by requiring de-
. fendant to agree in writing, to provide $100.00 a month 
"as an allowance for home and personal use," (Pl. Ex. D. 
Tr. 34) and when defendant executed the same on Feb-
ruary 27, 1947, plaintiff signed the deed to convey the 80 
acre tra<Ct. But after the deed was executed, defendant 
refused and neglected to pay plaintiff the monthly allow-
ance of $100.00 Tr. 34) and also the $1,100.00, owing on 
the note. 
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-In describing defendant's conduct towards plaintiff 
since their reconciliation in fall of 1946, the record dis-
closes: {Tr. 34). 
Q. From 1947 up to the time you filed your complaint 
in this action, did you live "vith the defendant during that 
period of time? A. Off and on. Q.. What. do you mean 
by "off and on?'' A. Well, he'd get into tantrums and if 
I wouldn't do everything he wanted to do he'd go for two 
or three weeks, and last summer he left for three months 
and didn't support me. He left me without any money 
or anything like that, and sometimes he's gone a week and 
sometimes three or four days. You never know. ( Tr. 34). 
Q. And then you had your final separation just about the 
time this complaint was filed, did you not? A. Yes. 
Q. And "vhat led up to that, ~1rs. Hendricks? A. Well, 
his staying out nights, not coming home. He'd leave four 
or five o'clock in the morning and wouldn't get home until 
two, four, five o'clock in the morning. Things like that. 
Q. The next morning?. A. Yes. Sometimes he would-
n't come at all. He didn't support me. He gave me some 
money but not very much, and he wrote bad checks right 
and left. Q. And did people contact you with respect to 
these bad checks? A. They certainly did. Q. By tele-
phone or in person? A. Some in person, some by tie-
phone. Q. And how did that affect you, Mrs. Hendricks? 
A. It disturbed me terribly. Q. Had you been ac-
customed to that? A. Never. (Tr. 35). Q. Now fll 
ask you this general question, Mrs. Hendricks. During this 
period since about September or October of 1946 up until 
the time this action was filed, in a general way have you 
been able to get along very well with the defendant? A. 
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In a general way I'd say no, and it's been mostly money 
matters all the time with us. Q. Has that affected your 
health and your well-being? A. Well, yes, it's been a lot 
of worry ·and trouble with it all through my married life. 
Q. Have you had quarrels with the defendant as a result 
of his conduct? A. Yes. Q. And have they been fre-
quent? A. Yes. Q And has that affected your well-
being and peace of mind? A. Certainly it has. (Tr. 37). 
Q. Mrs. Hendricks, from your experience with the de-: 
fendant, do you know now or do you believe you could 
live with him with any degree of success? A. No. Q. 
You think it would affect your health if you were living 
with him? A. That and my sanity. (Tr. 44). (Empha-
sis supplied). 
Plaintiff testifed that defendant became intoxicated 
quite frequently during the time she lived with him. ( Tr. 
137). He "\Vas arrested for drunken driving at Smithfield, 
Cache County, about December 20, 1948, by Highway 
Patrolman Ed. Pitcher. This occurred during the night-
time. Defendant admitted his plea of guilty to this charge 
and payment of a $100.00 fine, (Tr. 160-161) and his 
driver's license was revoked for the duration of one year. 
(Tr. 137-138). 
Sometime in the year 1950, the defendant was driving 
his car easterly on second north street in Logan, about 
midnight, in what two Logan Police Officers, who were 
followipg him, considered to be in an unlawful manner. 
(Tr. 130). They stopped him and took him home, leaving 
his car parked at second north and main streets. ( Tr. 131). 
Officer Ray Jones testified that, "We thought it best to 
take him home and not let him drive at the present (that) 
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thne." (Tr. 130). After arriving at plaintiff's home, plain-
tiff and defendant engaged in an argument, so the officer's 
took defendant in their car and they rode around for a 
considerable length of time and, until they considered that 
he was sober enough to drive his car home. ( Tr. 131). 
On this and other occasions defendant seemed to be under 
the influence of something, whether liquor or something 
else. Defendant admitted to plaintiff that he had smoked 
marjuana on several occasions. ( Tr. 187). 
When these parties were married, plaintiff owned an 
interest in the family home and in the sale thereof she 
received as her share $1,200.00. She also owned the bus-
iness property on main street in Logan, from which she 
received a monthly rental of $125.00. The taxes on this 
property amounted to about $25.00 per month. (Tr. 57). 
Thus she had about $100.00 clear above taxes. When de-
fendant loaned $1,300.00 from plaintiff in 1944. ( Tr. 30) 
she borrowed this amount from her bank for him and re-
paid it in monthly payments of $50.00. Plaintiff testified 
( Tr. 57) this amount, "all went for our living, Vic (the 
defendant) had the money and one way or the other it 
went for our living." ( Tr. 57). Thus it appears that the 
said rental of $100.00 from July 1, 1943, to the time the 
property was sold on October 31, 1946, amounting to 
$3,600.00, was used to pay off defendant's loan and for 
household support, and the $1,200.00 received from her 
interest in the home, all amounting to $4,800.00 was spent 
by plaintiff directly for defendant's benefit. 
When plaintiff and defendant separated in the sum-
mer of 1946, she had no home in Logan, so she purchased 
the home in which she is now residing. And in order to 
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purchase the same it became necessary to sell her business 
property, which was sold in October, 1946, from which 
sale she received the net amount of $21,065.00, ( Tr. 28). 
Plaintiff paid $6,000.00 for the home, ( Tr. 27) and ap-
proximately $3,000.00, for interior painting, wallpaper, car-
pets, drapes and remodeling, or a total of $9,000,00. She 
paid $2,750.00 for a car and at the time of trial she had 
two war bonds of net value of $1,640.00, or a total of 
$13,390.00. When this amount is subtracted from $21,-
065.00, it leaves a balance of $7,675.00 which amount was 
expended by plaintiff for household expenses between 
October, 1946, and March 1, 1952, when this action was 
filed. When $7,675.00 is added to $4,800.00 it will be 
seen that plaintiff contributed $12,475.00, toward support-
ing herself and defendant during their married life of 8 
years and 8 months. And the evidence will show that 
defendant lived upon the plaintiff's income which is de-
finitely proven by plaintiff's checks, and her bank state-
ments offered and received in evidence. And ·defendant 
has not denied that the above amount was spent for family 
and household expenses. 
Defendant has farm property at Lewiston, consisting 
of 154 acres of good irrigated farm land valued at $350.00 
per acre with improvements. (Tr. 4, 5). He also has 
certain warehouse property located near his borne which 
he values at about $1500.00. ( Tr. 170). Thus the real 
property according to a conservative value would be ap-
proximately $55,000.00. In January 1951, the defendant's 
boys intended to purchase this property, including all 
machinery and equipment and defendant then fixed the 
sale price at $68,000.00. ( Tr. 41). The mortgage indebt-
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edness at time of trial was $20,400.00. (Tr. 4). Defend-
ant had two tn1cks in which he had an equity of about 
$4,000.00. (Tr. 167-168 ). He also had a 1950 model 
Chevrolet. The farm without improvements is rented for 
the current year at a cash rental of $5,000.00, and the pro-
perty taxes are approximately $600.00. (Tr. 164). D~e­
fendant is receiving a net rental income this year o.f 
$5,400.00 (Tr. 164). 
The foregoing statement covers most of the pertinent 
facts in the case, however, if any facts have been over-
looked, they will likely be covered in the discussion of the 
evidence in the several points raised. 
The plaintiff brought this suit asking: 
1. For a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage 
contract. 
2. Awarding to plaintiff the expenditures made for 
household support in the sum of $12,475.00. 
3. For a reasonable property settlement or, in lieu 
thereof a reasonable alimony. 
4. Reasonable attorneys fee. 
5. Costs of suit. 
Statement of Points Upon Which Appellant .Intends 
to Rely for Reversal of Judgement and Decree. 
1. The Court erred in making it's findings of fact 
number four, it's conclusions of law and decree that plain-
tiff's complaint be dismissed on the merits with prejudice. 
(R. 7, 8, 9 ). 
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2. The Court erred in making it's findings number 
five, "That each of said parties were guilty of crimination 
and recrimination, one against the other," (R. 7) because 
there is no ple~ding or evidence to support the same. 
3. The Court erred in striking the plaintiff's testi-
mony and evidence. (Tr. 218-235). 
4. The Court erred in· refusing to award to plaintiff 
alimony and a property settlement, and in making the fol-
lowing portion of finding number three, viz,- "and used 
the proceeds thereof mostly for her own use and benefit." 
(R. 7, 8, 9). 
5. The Court erred in refusing to award plaintiff's 
attorney a reasonable fee. · 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. The Court erred in making it's findings of 
, fact number four, it's conclusions of law and decree 
that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed on the merits 
with prejudice. (R. 7, 8, 9). 
It is yery apparent from the courts oral findings made 
at the conclusion of the trial on June 9, 1952, that plaintiff 
had proven a case against the defendant on the grounds 
of cruelty as alleged in her compl~int, as will appear from 
the following oral findings made by the court: 
"The court feels that a divorce should be granted." 
(Tr. 206). 
"The court f~ds the parties can never live . to-
gether and that a divorce should be granted." (Tr. 207) 
The court further found: 
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"If I can do it legally I want to grant them both 
a divorce, or I want to grant a divorce without refer-
ring to who gets it." xxx 'but on the whole case it does 
appear there should be a divorce." ( Tr. 207). 
From the foregoing findings it definitely appeared 
that the plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence to en-
title her to a divorce, but the court apparently did not want 
to create the enmity of the defendant. 
It also appeared that the court did not want to assume 
the task of making a property settlement which plaintiff 
included in the prayer of her complaint. In this connect-
ion reference is made to the following oral finding, made 
by the court on June 23, 1952. 
"Can I grant both parties the divorce or can I 
grant a divorce without referring to who gets it? That 
becomes important, as you will appreciate, because 
the court has in mind making certain property orders, 
and if I grant her a divorce I feel compelled to do 
certain things I wouldn't otherwise do. I won't grant 
either party a divorce. It's a question of granting 
both of them a divorce or dismissing the proceedings 
on the merits, both of them being guilty of such acts 
of a criminal nature that the ·court cannot conscient-
iously grant a divorce to one side and brand one party 
as a guilty person and embellish another one as a 
lilywhite person entitled to a kind of relief this court 
should grant. So please do some research. If I have 
a chance I,ll grant a divorce to both parties. Whether 
I can do it or not I don, t know.,, ( Tr. 207). Italics 
added. 
On June 23, 1952, in open court, the court made the 
following statement: 
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"Let the record show that both counsel are now 
present, as well as Mr. Hendri~cks. Mr. Nelson, as I 
indicated heretofore, unless somebody wants to sug-
gest a stipulation or something, I'm going to direct 
Sjostrom to prepare findings of fact and conclusions 
of law and decree dismissing both the complaint and 
the counterclaim on the merits with prejudice. But 
if counsel care to make a suggestion to the court, or 
if you want.to make a stipulation I'll grant a divorce to 
both parties against each other." xxx "What I would 
like to do is grant a divorce to both parties. They 
both have children, and there might be some ego ad-
vantage to each party to feel that they had each won 
the case. But in view of the dearth of authorities 
under which I dare do that, I won't do it unless you 
stipulate to it.'' (Italics added). 
When the parties could not agree upon a property 
settlement, the court entered it's formal findings, conclus-
ions and decree on July 31, 1952. (. 7, 8). In paragraph 
two, the court finds as follows: 
"That since about the month of May, 1944, de-
fendant has treated plaintiff cruelly, causing her great 
mental and physical distress, as follows: "That said 
defendant has frequently become intoxicated, has fre-
quently stayed away from home overnight without 
just cause, has exchanged "mash" notes with women 
friends, once or twice has threatened to do bodily 
harm to the plaintiff, all of which actions has caused 
the plaintiff great mental distress." 
As an apparent offset to the foregoing findings, the 
court's finding number four is as follows: 
"That since said marriage the plaintiff has also 
been guilty of cruel treatment of defendant, to the 
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extent of causing defendant great mental distress and 
travail, in this: That said plaintiff has been a frequent 
user of of intoxicating liquors, that she deserted and 
abandoned the defendant's domicile and residence at 
Lewiston and moved to Logan without just cause and 
excuse, that she wrongfully refused to sign a mortgage 
to the Bear River State Bank at Tremonton, which 
mortgage was asked for in good faith by the defendant 
in furtherance of his business, that plaintiff wrong-
fully accused the defendant of being a drug addict to 
a certain police officer of Logan City and attempted 
to have the defendant incarcerated and jailed on that 
charge.'' 
It is respectfully submitted that the court erred in 
making finding number four in view of the fact that the 
court had already entered it's finding numb~r two, which 
entitled the plaintiff to a divorce from the defendant. 
From an examination of the record, it w~ll be seen that 
there is no substantial evidence upon which the court 
could make the findings contained in number four. There 
is no evidence in the r'ecord that plaintiff has been a fre-
quent user of intoxicating liquors. There is no evidence 
in the record to prove that plaintiff deserted and aband-
oned the defendant's domicile when she moved from Lew-
iston to Logan, in July of 1946. Plaintiff's testimony is to 
the effect that for two years immediately prior to that 
time, defendant had treated plaintiff cruelly and things 
were going from bad to worse. (Tr. 15-17, 24, 25). And 
moreover, the evidence shows that within three months 
after plaintiff left the defendant as aforesaid, they became 
reconciled and lived and cahabitated together as husband 
and wife. (Tr. 26). Thus defendant condoned whatever cru-
elty, if any, theretofore existing between the parties. And 
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assuming, but not conceding, that plaintiff wrongfully re- . 
fused to sign a mortgage to the Bear River State Bank, 
which was prior to their separation in July, 1946, upon the 
aforesaid reconciliation thereafter between the parties, 
(Tr. 26) plaintiff's refusal to sign said mortgage was also 
condoned. There is no testimony in the record that plain-
tiff accused defendant of being a drug addict. The un-
disputed testimony on this question was testified to by 
the police officers. The officers were called to plaintiff's 
residence because defendant was creating a disturbance 
there. On another occasion when defendant was found 
driving easterly on second north street in Logan City on 
the lefthand side of the street by two police officers, he 
was taken into custody by them and taken to his home. 
The plaintiff as well as the officers observed that there 
was something wrong with the defendant on that occasion. 
( Tr. 130). There is absolutely no testimony in the record 
that plaintiff at any time, attempted to have the defendant 
incarcerated and jailed. 
However, the court seemed to overlook the fact that 
the defendant was arrested at Smithfield and charged with 
driving his automobile while under the influence of liquor. 
To this charge defendant entered a plea of gl!ilty and paid 
a fine of $100.00, and his drivers license was revoked for 
one year. This was admitted by de.fendant. (Tr. 160-161). 
It is a matter of common knowledge that Police or 
Highway Patrolmen, do not usually arrest an individual 
for a first offense unless an accident has occurred, and it 
is very likely that defendant was warned by the Highway 
Patrolmen on previous occasions. When the record is care-
fully examinea, it will be seen that there is no substantial 
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evidence to support the courts finding number four, but it 
was resorted to by the court in order to offset the courts 
finding number two, and thus pave the way for the court 
to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, and thus relieve the court 
of having to grant plaintiff the relief prayed for in her 
- complaint. The court was, under the evidence, not justi-
fied or warranted in dismissing plaintiffs complaint with 
prejuidce. The judgment as finally made by the court 
was in direct conflict to it's previous finding, viz: 
"The court feels that a divorce should be granted. 
The court finds the parties can never live together 
and that a divorce should be granted." (Tr. 206, 207). 
Assuming, but not conceding, that the parties were 
equally at fault, the court ignored the well known rule that 
on grounds of cruelty, the court~, including this Court, 
grant the wife a decree of divorce on much less evidence 
than they do the husband. 
In the case of Doe v. Doe, 48 Utah 200; 158 Pac. 781, 
this Court applied this salutary rule: 
"The adjudged cases show that courts, on the 
ground of cruelty, grant the wife a decree on much 
less evidence than they do the husband. That rests 
on sound principles, for acts and conduct on the part 
of a husband may well constitute cruelty to the wife 
causing her great mental distress, when similar acts 
and rconduct on her part may not constitute cruelty 
to him, or cause him great mental distress. Before a 
decree is granted the husband on such ground, it 
ought to be a somewhat aggravated case." 
In Hyrup v. Hyrup, 66 Utah 580, 245 P. 335, the rule 
· was stated: 
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"A husband asking divorce for cruelty because of 
"great mental distress" caused by spouse must present 
a much stronger and somewhat aggravated case in 
comparison with that required of wife asking divorce 
on such ground, since wife may be more easily made 
to suffer great mental distress." 
In Cordner v. Cordner, 61 P. 2d. 601:~ this rule was 
re-stated by this Court-
"The adjudged cases show that courts, on the 
grounds of cruelty, grant the wife a decree on much 
less evidence than they do the husband. That rests 
on sound principles, for acts and conduct on the part 
of a husband may well constitute cruelty to the wife 
causing her great mental distress, when similar acts 
and conduct on the part of a husband may well con-
stitute cruelty to the wife causing her great mental 
distress, when similar acts and conduct on her part 
may not constitute cruelty to him, or cause him great 
mental distress. Before a decree is granted the hus-
band on such ground, it ought to be a somewhat ag-
gravated case." 
And in the foregoing opinion the court stated the fol-
lowing rule: 
"Two people who cannot adjust themselves should 
not by the court be required to maintain a relationship 
that has become intolerable to them." 
When the rule adhered to in the foregoing cases is 
applied to the courts finding two and four, judgment 
should be rendered in favor of the plaintiff as prayed for in 
her complaint. It is respectfully submitted that the trial 
court committed reversible error in its failure and refusal 
to grant plaintiff a divorce and the relief demanded in her 
complaint. 
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Point 2. The Cmtrt erred in making it's finding 
number five, "that each of said parties were guilty of 
crimination and recrimination, one against the other," 
(R. 7) because there is no pleading or evidence to sup-
port the same. 
It is respectfully submitted that the defendant did not 
plead the defense of recrimination in his answer or counter-
claim. In paragraph six of defendant's counterclaim, he 
alleges in very general terms that plaintiff's cruel treatment 
caused defendant great mental distress, and has made life 
with plaintiff impossible. It will thus be seen that de-
fendant was seeking a divorce from plaintiff, as is further 
evidenced by the prayer in his counterclaim, viz,- "that 
defendant be granted a divorce against the plaintiff." 
Thus there was no issue raised by the pleadings, 
( R. 2, 3) nor by the testimony of either party, on question 
of recrimination. The case was concluded and submitted 
to the court on ~1ay 12, 1952. (Tr. 205). The doctrine 
of recrimination was, to the surprise of both parties, first 
mentioned by the court on June 9, 1952, in announcing it's 
decision: ( Tr. 206). 
"The court finds both parties guilty of crimina-
tion and recrimination, finds all of the allegations and 
proof of both parties true and correct, except that the 
court finds that Mr. Hendricks was never, within the 
issues of the case, a user of narcotics or drugs." 
(Tr. 206). 
It will thus be seen that by injecting the doctrine of 
recrimination in this case aft{}r both parties had submitted 
all of the testimony, and the case was closed, the court 
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thereby introduced a new theory, not submitted to the 
court by either the pleadings or the evidence of either 
party. 
If a trial court could thus ignore the issues as pre-
sented to the court by the pleadings in this case, and intro-
duce a completely new and strange theory not contem-
plated by either party, then pleadings would serve no pur-
pose and be of no avail. And moreover, if a court could 
ignore the issues presented to it by the parties in the case 
at bar, then a court could ignore the issues presented by 
the pleadings in any case. Such a procedure would com-
pletely destroy the orderly conduct and purose of a trial. 
Neither counsel ~or client could vouchsafe what the result 
of such a· trial might be. 
The courts hold that the doctrine of recrimination 
must be pleaded in order to be available as a defense. 
In Oppeman v. Opperman, 65 N.E. 2d. 655, it was 
held by the Ohio Court of Appeals that,-
"The doctrine of recrimination is recognized as 
a defense which must be pleaded in order to be avail-
able." 
·In the case of Brandt v. Brandt (N.D.) 33 N.W. 2d. 
620, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held: 
"We conclude, however, that the· general rule is 
that recrimination is a defense which must be pleaded 
in order to warrant the court in considering it. Young 
v. Young, (25 A.L.R. 1049); Jones v. Jones, 18 N.J. 
Eq. 33, 90 Am. Dec. 607; Keezer on Marriage and 
Divorce, Sec. 805; Nelson on Divorce, 2nd Edition, 
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Sec. 10.10; 17 Am. Juris. 314, Sec. 325." xxx "We hold 
that recrimination is an affirmative defense to be 
availed of only when pleaded and relied on by the 
defendant." 
In Welch v. Welch (Florida) 152 So. 173, it was 
held that,-
"Recrimination as a bar to divorce otherwise 
grantable, except where adultery is the basis of re ... 
crimination, should be asserted as an affirmative de-
fense in answer and pleaded with same particularity 
as charged in complaint for divorce." 
The rule is also concisely stated in 19 C.J. 116, in the 
following language: 
"As a general rule recrimination, to be available 
as a defense, must be set up in the answer. The mis-
conduct must be set out in the answer with the same 
particularity as to time, place, and circumstance as is 
requU:ed in a complaint for divorce on the same 
ground." 
In 17 Am. Jur. 314, Sec. 325, the rule is stated: 
"Strictly, recrimination is an affirmative defense 
which must be specially pleaded or set up in answer 
as a defense in order that the defendant may have the 
right to give proof of such defense." (Annotation 
76 A.L.R. 991- Young v. Young (N.J.) 119 A. 92 
25 A.L.R. 1049). 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court com-
mitted reversible error when it introduced the doctrine of 
recrimination as a defense in this case and decided the 
case upon that theory when it was not either pleaded or 
relied upon by the defendant. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
And moreover, the judgment as rendered is unusually 
drastic, in providing that it is enterd with prejudice, ( Tr. 
214). This is tanamount to placing the parties in a strait-
jacket. Plaintiff testified that she could not endure to live 
with defendant. That it would seriously effect her health 
and her sanity. ( Tr.· 44). Thus the court was advised of 
her attitude, yet notwithstanding such information he an-
nounced: "This dismissal will be with prejudice. I don't 
want either of them to file a new lawsuit based on any-
thing in the past. They'll have to go back together and 
start fighting again. (Tr. 214). 
Point 3. The Court erred in striking the plain-
tiffs testimony and evidence. 
It is respectfully submitted that the court erred in 
striking the testimony offered by plaintiff ( Tr. 218-235) 
because this evidence definitely disclosed that while the 
parties were living together the defendant was consorting 
with other women. During the summer of either 1949, 
or 1950 ( Tr. 224) plaintiff took some of defendants clothes 
to the farm at Lewiston and upon her arrival there found 
a Mrs. Stewart of Preston, Idaho, at the home with de-
fendant and they were in an intoxicated condition. Plain-
tiff had previously heard about Mrs. Stewart having been 
at the Lewiston home with the defendant on prior occas-
ions. ( Tr. 224). ·Apparently, when plaintiff entered the 
home and found defendant and Mrs. Stewart there, it had 
a tendency to sober Mrs. Stewart, since as plaintiff testi-
fied, Mrs. Stewart went out of the house "like an antelope." 
(Tr. 224). At that time plaintiff had actual knowledge of 
what had previously been a rumor. Plaintiff remonstrated 
with the defendant, but he was toointoxicated to know 
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what she was talking about. (Tr. 225) .. When plaintiff 
arrived at the home and found Mrs. Stewart there alone 
with the defendant, she felt terrible about it. ( Tr. 225). 
Plaintiff remonstrated with defendant at a later time about 
his promiscuity with Mrs. Stewart and other women. 
(Tr. 225). 
The evidence also discloses that defendant received a 
letter (Pl. Ex. BB) from a Mrs. J. H. Jones of San Fran-
cisco, California, couched in very intimate and endearing 
terms. (Tr. 225-227). Plaintiff's Exs. AA, CC and DO 
were written by a woman from a neighboring town near 
Lewiston. They reveal that a very intimate relationship 
existed between herself and the defendant. Exhibit "DD" 
refers to defendant's Chevrolet, which he owned and op-
erated prior to purchasing a new 1950 model Chevrolet. 
(Tr. 177). From the text of Ex. D,D it definitely appeard 
that their relationship covered a considerable period of 
time. 
Prior to the time the foregoing testimony w-as adduced 
the court stated,-
"but if there's any branch of cruelty we haven't 
heard, I propose to hear the nature of it." ( Tr. 217). 
The foregoing testimony had not been previously of-
fered during the trial. And this testimony was material 
and relevant to prove mental cruelty. The court totally 
ignored the foregoing statement when it later granted 
defendant's motion to strike this testimony. ( Tr. 235). 
Point ·4. The Court erred in refusing to award 
to Plaintiff alimony and a property settlement, and in 
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making the following portion of finding number three, 
viz,- "and used the proceeds thereof mostly for her 
own use and benefit.:~' (Tr. 7, 8, 9 ). 
The evidence is without dispute in this case that as a 
result of this marriage the plaintiff has suffered a serious 
property and financial loss. At the time of the marriage 
between these parties, the plaintiff owned business pro-
perty in Logan, from which she was receiving a monthly 
rental income of $115.00, and a few months later it was 
raised to $125.00, per month. The taxes were about $25.00 
per month. (Tr. 56). The evidence disclosed that from 
the date of this marriage, in June, 1943, to the summer of 
1946, this income aside from taxes was all spent by plain-
tiff for household expenses because of defendant's failure 
to support plaintiff. This is proven by plaintiff's cancelled 
checks and bank statements offered in evidence. At the 
time of the marriage, plaintiff also owned a share in the 
family home and at the time of the sale thereof she re-
ceived the sum of $1200.00, Tr. 40) and this amount was 
also spent for household expenses. 
It will thus be seen that during the period of approx-
imately three years while plaintiff was living with the 
defendant on his farm at Lewiston, she spent from her 
own funds approximately $4,800.00, for household ex-
penses, which became necessary because defendant failed 
to provide-support. And during which period of time the 
defendant spent very little, if any, of his own funds for that 
purpose. 
In the summer of 1946, when these parties separated, 
plaintiff had no home in Logan, so she purchased the home 
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in which she is now residing. ( Tr. 27, 28). And to pur-
chase the same it became necessary to sell her business 
property, which was sold in October of 1946, from which 
sale she received the net amount of $21,065.00. ( Tr. 29). 
From this amount plaintiff paid $6,000.00 for the home, 
and approximately $3,000.00 for interior painting and 
decorating, carpets, drapes and remodeling. She paid 
$2,750.00 for a car and at time of trial she had two war 
bonds, net value of $1,640.00, or a total of $13,390.00. 
When this amount is subtracted from $21,06500, it leaves 
a balance of $7,675.00, all of which was expended. by the 
plaintiff for household expenses between October, 1946, 
and March 1, 1952 when this action was filed. (Tr. 38, 39). 
When this amount is added to $4,800.00, plaintiff has con-
tributed altogether $12,475.00, toward supporting herself 
and defendant during their married life of approximately 
8 years and 8 months. The evidence thus shows that de-
fendant lived upon the plaintiffs income, which is defin-
itely proven by plaintiff's checks, (Ex. A-0) and her bank 
statements offered and received in evidence. And de-
fendant has not denied that the above amount was spent 
for family and household expenses. 
And while plaintiff was spending her money for fam-
ily support, resulting in the depletion of her estate, the 
defendant'~ property remained intact. He has not lost 
anything by way of diminution of property; and the pres-
ent mortgage on his property was placed there by the 
defendant to pay his debts, and that the balance owing 
on the principal amount of the mortgage debt is $20,400.-
00. The evidence further shows that his property is worth 
in the neighborhood of $68,000.00. (Tr. 41 ). Mr. Watkins, 
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agent and appraiser for Prudential Life testified that the 
defendant's farm property was worth $350.00 an acre with 
improvements. (Tr. 4, 5). This did not include personal 
property such as trucks, automobile, farm machinery and 
equipment, nor the warehouse property. Plaintiff testi-
fied that about a year ago when defendant intended to 
sell the farm, improvements thereon and personal property 
to his boys, the sale price was $68,000.00 (Tr. 41). This 
contemplated sale did not include the warehouse property. 
Defendant testified that this property was worth about 
$1,500.00. ( Tr. 170) and it is extremely doubtful that de-
fendant would sell his entire property at this time for less 
than $70,000.00. 
Thus there is definite proof that when the present 
mortgage indebtedness of $20,400.00, is subtracted from 
the total worth of defendant's farm property, the net value 
thereof is about $50,000.00~ It is rather unusual that plain-
tiff should be required to spend approximately $12,475.00, 
of her money in less than nine years, when the defendant 
owned one of the best farms in Lewiston, (Tr. 5) with a 
net worth of approximately $50,000.00. 
It is respectfully submitted that plaintiff is entitled 
to have restored her property holding and earnings here-
inbefore referred to, which totals $12,475.00. In addition 
to that she should be entitled to permanent alimony. 
The general rule provides that the size of the hus-
band's estate is material in fixing the amount of permanent 
alimony for the support of the wife. In 19 C. J. 253, Sec· 
tion 588, the following rule is stated: 
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"Permanent alimony being in the nature of pro-
perty, the court in awarding it should consider primar-
ily the amount of the husband's property (cases cited). 
The estate of the husband which is taken into con-
sideration in fixing the amount of alimony is usually 
the estate which he owned at the time of divorce." 
This Court has fixed the alimony and property settle-
ment on an amount, equal to one-third or one-half of de-
fendant's estate. The following Utah cases so hold: 
In the case of Lyon v. ~yon (Utah) 206 P. 2d. 148, 
this court said: 
"The right in lieu of dower in Utah is only one-
third to the wife. Strict divisions of property have 
gone as high as one-half each." 
In the case of Woolley v. Woolley, 112 Utah 391, 195 
P. 2d. 743, this court confirmed a settlement made for the 
parties by the trial court in the following language: 
"The court in its decree provided for the distribu-
tion of the property on the following basis: There 
was a cash offer of $30,000.00 made for the Cotton-
wood property and the trial court ordered this sold. 
From the proceeds received, the plaintiff was to re-
ceive $8,000.00 more than the defendant. Plaintiff 
was decreed war savings bonds of the face value of 
$10,000.00, and the defendant was awarded the bal-
. ance of the property. Assuming the Cottonwood pro-
perty was to sell for $30,000.00, then the distribution 
as ordered by the court is as follows: Plaintiff is to 
receive $19,000.00 from the· sale of the home and 
$10,000.00 from the war bonds, or a total of $29,000.-
00. In determining generally what a wife is entitled 
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to when a divorce decree has been granted to the 
husband, we have considered one-third as being a 
fair proportion." 
It should also be kept in mind that although Mrs. 
Woolley was given one-third of the property, the court 
granted Mr. Woolley a divorce against his wife on grounds 
of mental cruelty. And she had not supported the family 
from separate income. 
The case of Tremayne v. Tremayne 211 P. 2d. 452, 
the trial court awarded plaintiff (wife) the divorce and 
, about four-fifths of property acquired during marriage. 
On appeal by husband the judgment was affirmed: 
In view of the foregoing decisions when applied to the 
above stated facts, relative t-o plaintiff's lack of income 
and her inability to work ( Tr. 70) and the fact that the 
defendant has the ability to work and has a substantial 
yearly rental income from the farm of $5,400.00, after 
taxes, ( Tr. 164) and he can thus devote his full time to 
other employment which should yield a substantial in-
come. When these factors are considered it would seem 
fair to both parties,_ if this court award to the plaintiff the 
sum of $12,475.00, which she has contributed for house-
. hold expenses, together with reasonable alimony. 
The court erred in its finding (No. 3) that plaintiff 
had used most of the proceeds from the sale of her business 
property for her· own benefit. The income from said pro-
perty from the date of her marriage to the date of sale, 
amounted to approximately $4,800.00, which was used for 
family support. (Tr.57). When this amount is added to the 
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net sale price of $21,065.00, the total is $25,865.00. From 
that amount plaintiff expended approximately $12,475.00 
for household support, which is just a little less than one-
half of $25,865.00. Thus plaintiff used approximately one-
baH of the amount of money she received from the income 
and sale of business property for her own use, and the 
other one-half was used for family support. 
Point 5. The court erred in refusing to award 
plaintiffs attorney an attorney's fee. 
It is respectfully submitted that the court erred in 
refusing to make an award for plaintiff's attorney. It was 
stipulated and agreed by court and counsel that plaintiff 
would not be required to submit proof on the reasonable-
ness of the fee in this case. ( Tr. 76) . 
Considering the amount of property involved in this 
case and the an1ount of legal services performed in the 
preparation and trial of this case and, the services to be 
rendered in this appeal, it would seem that an award of 
$750.00, would not be excessive. Burtt v. Burtt, 204 P. 
91; Openshaw v. Openshaw. 12 P. 2d. 364. 
In approving of $750.00, in the Burtt case, this Court 
said: 
"The record here shows that at the time of the 
trial plaintiff was earning a salary of $5,500 per an-
num. According to plaintiff's own estimate he is pos-
sessed of household goods and effects of the approxi-
mate value of $2,500, a house and lot in Pasadena of 
the value of $3,500 and his liabilities do not exceed 
$2,500, including the liabilities incurred by him in 
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his efforts to litigate and settle his matrimonial diffi-
culties. Under all the circumstances as disclosed by 
the record here, we are not prepared to say that the 
district court, in a warding an attorney fee of $750, so 
abused its discretion that this court would be justified 
in making any intervention. It therefore follows that 
the allowance of alimony and the expenses of a trial 
of this nature, including attorneys' fees, are largely 
matters within the discretion of the court who tried 
h , t e case. 
And moreover, when this Burtt case was decided by 
this Court in January, 1922, the value of the dollar was 
greatly enhanced over the value of the current dollar. 
This situation was also true in the year 1932, when 
this court decided Openshaw v. Openshaw, supra, yet this 
Court approved a fee of $500.00, fixed by the trial court. 
In the course of the opinion this ·Court stated: 
"It is asserted that there is no evidence to sup-
port the finding made by the trial court that $500 is 
a reasonable amount to be be paid for the wife's at-
torney's fee, and that there is no evidence upon which 
this court can make an award on that account. We 
do not agree with either of these contentions. It is 
true that no witness testified as to what is a reasonable 
fee to be allowed. But the whole record was before 
the trial court. The record dis·closed all facts that 
are generally taken into account by the trial courts in 
this state in making awards for attorney's fees in 
divorce actions. The same facts likewise appear by 
the record in this court. Without enumerating them 
it is sufficient to say that we think they are ample to 
support the finding that a fee of $500 is a reasonable 
fee to be paid for the services of plaintiff's attorney 
in the trial court., 
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The appellant respectfully submits to this Honorable 
Court that the findings, conclusions and judgment of the 
trial court be reversed, remanding the case and directing 
that the trial court enter findings, conclusions and decree, 
awarding to plaintiff a decree of divorce, a reasonable 
property settlement, reasonable alimony, attorney's fee 
and costs. 
L. E. NELSON, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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